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Turning Labor into Capital: Pension Funds and 
the Corporate Control of Finance 
 
Michael A. McCarthy 
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 
 
Abstract 
This article explores union attempts to control pension fund investment for the debate on financial restructuring 
in the United States. It puts popular control of finance into comparative and historical perspective and argues 
that laws and politics help explain why the flow of finance is corporate controlled. First, changes in the legal 
regime—the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974—put 
constraints on labor’s ability to influence investment decisions. This is evident when comparing single- and 
multi-employer plans, where the laws had different consequences. Second, attempts to reform these laws 
failed. Had they been successful, Carter’s proposed economic revitalization plan in the run-up to his failed 
reelection in 1980 would have created new ways for unions to control and redirect retirement investment for 
social purposes. The reform failure is treated as a “suppressed historical alternative” through a comparison with 
a successful reform in Quebec, Canada, which gave unions broad controls over the Solidarity Fund in 1983. The 
findings suggest, somewhat counter-intuitively, that legal restrictions need to be loosened for democratic 
control of finance to be possible. For pension funds, more regulations led to more corporate control, not less. 
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Since the Great Recession in 2008, writers have spilled much ink over how to restructure finance in 
America.1 Their contributions convey the urgent need to reregulate finance and to direct capital flows toward 
social and more productive ends, but efforts to draw on lessons from the past have been scarce. This article 
explores some of the barriers to financial control by nonelite actors through an analysis of pension fund 
investment in the United States since World War II. It puts the weakness of popular control of financial 
investments into comparative and historical context. 
In the mid-1970s, American capitalism shifted toward decentralized and freer markets and shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance. This laid the groundwork for flexible investment allocation guided solely by financial 
imperatives.2 Part and parcel of this shift was the rapid financialization of the US economy. From 1975 to 2004, 
stock and bond market capitalization increased from 102 percent to 289 percent of GDP, respectively.3 And 
firms that were once centrally concerned with production increasingly turned to financial speculation. The 
portion of total corporate profits accruing to financial investments rose from about 10 percent at the beginning 
of the 1980s to 40 percent by the 2000s.4 A small financial elite, located in the major corporations, banks, hedge 
funds, and pension funds, have been the primary beneficiaries, watching their wealth, income, and political 
power grow.5 But it has proven disastrous for both economic stability and equity.6 
Recently, Fred Block has called for a “new regime of accumulation” in the United States. He shows how crucial it 
is to restructure financial flows to encourage investments into new energy technologies, transportation systems, 
urban infrastructure, and training programs for the labor force.7 New investment channels are necessary to 
create more productive domestic uses of finance. And as Paul Krugman writes, “they don’t need to be visionary 
projects like ultra-high-speed rail; they can be mainly prosaic investments.”8 Of course, this is not a postcrisis 
idea. The need for capitalist investment criteria to incorporate social factors that, under certain conditions, 
trump profits was explored well before and pensions were central in that discussion.9 The crisis does, however, 
make it all the more urgent. But while there have been watered down attempts at postcrisis reregulation, 
deeper forms of financial restructuring remain unrealized.10 Instead, financial flows remain largely undisturbed 
and directed by large profit-driven financial institutions. Where a more democratically accountable system of 
asset allocation could stand, the one that endures is staffed by elites and guided by financial imperatives. 
Pension funds occupy a unique place within these financial markets. First, workers’ funds have amassed a huge 
financial fortune since their widespread emergence in the 1950s. They went from small holdings during the war 
to having over $10 trillion in assets by 2010. And since the recovery in corporate profits after the 2008 crash, 
their financial assets have grown quarterly.11 Second, the funds became a major source of capital for US firms. 
By the 1970s, pension funds controlled almost 25 percent of all US corporate equity, far more than the funds 
anywhere else in the world in both relative and absolute terms. The scale of these holdings alone has led some 
to characterize American capitalism as “pension fund capitalism.”12 Third, while the ownership status of fund 
assets is vague, they are typically treated like a deferred wage for workers. So unlike the financial investments of 
firms or banks, workers have recognized claims over them. Finally, and what will shortly be our prime concern, 
despite having some property rights, most workers and the unions that represent them never had meaningful 
control over fund investments. Instead, fiduciaries—employed by banks and other large financial institutions 
and under the direction of employer-dominated trustee boards—followed investment trends in financial 
markets. The failure of unions to control their pension funds is a key feature of financialization. It provides 
insight into how legal factors both helped to create corporate-controlled workers’ finance and continue to pose 
political obstacles to financial democratization. 
This article proceeds in five parts. First, it briefly outlines the argument for why unions have been unable to 
control pension fund finance. Second, it reviews the historical data and methods used to make that argument. 
Third, it provides a historical primer on pension fund investment in the United States. The fourth section 
analyzes the relationship between the laws governing the pension system and labor’s diminishing capacity to 
influence fund investment decisions. It does so through three levels of comparison: between different US unions 
in similar legal contexts, between similar US unions across time in different legal contexts, and between Carter’s 
failed legal reform in the United States and the more successful reform in Quebec, Canada with the creation of 
the Solidarity Fund. The final section concludes, reiterating the findings and speculating on the implications for 
democratic financial restructuring in the United States. 
Why Unions Don’t Control Pension Finance 
Employer control of pension finance has its origin in the postwar period, almost two decades before the 
financialization of the US economy began. Collectively bargained pension plans were practically nonexistent 
before World War II. The handful of American employees eligible for a pension tended to be better-paid salaried 
workers; companies rarely offered plans to workers earning an hourly wage. But after the war organized labor 
made major gains in the private pension system by winning contracts that included retirement plans.13 Over 50 
percent of unionized employees had pension coverage at the end of 1957. In the same year about 10 million of 
the approximately 17 million employees covered were in unions.14 The result of large and rapid increases in the 
number of participants in retirement plans was a massive build-up of plan assets. But before union members 
could decide how to allocate this finance, employers and the state intervened. 
Recent policy scholars show that changes in pensioning and healthcare in this period were contested and tended 
to be driven by the interplay of competing firm and union interests and legal and political changes.15 Although 
research shows that the United States developed its relatively large private welfare state due to union weakness 
and political defeats, the inability of unions to control pension finance is a barely-examined aspect of the 
postwar period, a fact made all the more curious by their size and centrality to the financial system. Following 
the recent scholarship’s emphasis on the interplay between interest groups and political institutions,16 this 
article makes a two-part argument. First, the capacity of the unions in the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO)—and later the merged American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)—to 
control fund investment decisions was incrementally eroded by federal legal regulations governing private 
pensioning. Second, union weakness and the dominance of pro-market policy makers kept anti-union laws on 
the books and blocked union control-oriented reforms, as happened with the Solidarity Fund in Quebec, Canada 
in the early 1980s. 
On the one hand, provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 largely transformed labor’s retirement assets into a 
pool of employer-controlled finance by weakening the ability of unions to influence decision making on pension 
boards. Only in multi-employer pension plans, which emerged through industry-wide bargaining agreements 
where the structure of collective bargaining created opportunities to get around the intent of law, did unions 
successfully influence fund investment at the board level. On the other hand, the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 further restricted even these multi-employer pension funds by making diversified 
portfolios, heavily invested in equities, a main component of fiduciary prudence. ERISA made it even more 
difficult for unions to influence investment decisions in traditional funds. 
However, increasing regulatory restrictions aren’t the only dimension of labor’s inability to control pension 
funds. To reform the legal constraints on unions, labor needed active support from Democrats, particularly their 
allies in the North. Up to the 1970s, this support was not forthcoming. But this shifted in the run-up to Carter’s 
lost reelection campaign against Reagan in 1980. Carter, other Northern Democrats, and unions supported an 
economic revitalization plan that created a tripartite investment board that increased union control over 
retirement funds. Although this plan failed because of union weakness and the rise of Reaganism, in the 
historical juncture it represents what Barrington Moore terms a “suppressed historical alternative.”17 A 
comparison with the more successful establishment of the Solidarity Fund in 1983 illustrates how legal reforms 
were necessary to give labor substantial control over financial investments in Quebec. 
Logic of Inquiry 
The argument is made inductively from archival materials from unions, business associations, and state sources. 
First, I drew heavily from the AFL-CIO collection, which is housed at the George Meany Memorial Archives in 
Silver Spring, Maryland. Within these materials, I analyzed subcommittee reports, memoranda, newspaper 
articles, studies related to pensioning, letters, speeches, literature, and congressional testimony. Second, I used 
materials from peak employers’ associations: the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM), and the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), the premiere employers’ research 
institution. These materials are housed at the Hagley Library in Wilmington, Delaware. Here, the data consists of 
sub-committee reports, conference minutes, memoranda, studies related to pensioning and collective 
bargaining, letters, speeches, literature, and congressional testimony. In total, I analyzed over 11,000 documents 
from the 1930s to the 1990s. 
To understand the relationship between changes in the legal regime and labor’s ability to control pension funds, 
I scrutinized debates both between employers and unions and within employers’ associations and unions 
concerning contests over fund investment and federal legislation. Union debates about what was possible within 
the legal constraints offers evidence for significant variation in union capacity over time and between unions 
with single- and multi-employer plans. Finally, the major legislation governing pensions, Taft-Hartley (1947) and 
ERISA (1974), were passed at the federal level. To understand what legislators intended to do with the laws and 
how organized labor likely saw its impact, I reviewed the congressional debates. 
I used a three-level comparative-historical strategy to account for the link between laws and union capacity to 
influence pension fund investment: comparisons between US unions in similar legal contexts, comparisons of US 
unions across time in different legal contexts, and comparisons with unions in other national-legal contexts. 
First, I compared unions with single-employer plans to unions with multi-employer plans because the two types 
of plans were constrained by the 1947 Taft-Hartley law in different ways. Multi-employer pension plans offered 
greater legal capacity to unions to gain control, as both the case of the Teamsters’ pension fund and historical 
statistics suggest. Second, I compare the impact of legislative reforms on US unions that had made advances in 
influencing fund investment decisions over time. On the one hand, I consider the impact of Taft-Hartley on the 
control capacities of unions like the United Steel Workers (USW)—unions with single-employer plans. And on 
the other hand, I examine how ERISA in 1974 changed the investment strategies of multi-employer funds and 
the labor movement as a whole. Finally, I consider the creation of the Solidarity Fund in Quebec, Canada—a case 
of a union federation gaining control over pension fund investment decisions on a scale unseen elsewhere. In 
comparison to Carter’s failed economic revitalization plan, Quebec provides insight as a case where legal 
reforms created new pensioning instruments that were governed by the provincial labor movement. These 
comparisons show that legal regulations set the “rules of the game” and circumscribed labor’s capacity for 
control. 
A Brief History of Union Pension Fund Investment 
After collectively bargained pension plans were established in the postwar period, fund assets were primarily 
directed into bonds. However, armed with efficient market theory, fund fiduciaries in the private sector radically 
changed their investment strategies in the mid-1950s and began to prioritize investment in stocks instead. In 
1950, government securities and corporate bonds accounted for 29.9 and 41.8 percent of fund assets, 
respectively. By 1972, government securities only accounted for 2.4 percent and corporate bonds, 17.7 percent. 
Compare this with the rapid increase of corporate equity investments. In 1950, corporate equities only 
accounted for 16.4 percent of pension fund assets. In 1972, they reached a height of 73.8 percent (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Asset Distribution of Noninsured Private Pension Funds, 1950–1979. 
(Author’s calculations from Board of Governors, 2010) 
 
The rechanneling of pension finance into the equity market was massive. In 1949, pension funds had only $586 
million invested in stocks. Just one year later that figure doubled. The amount had climbed to $3.1 billion by 
1954, to $16 billion by 1960, and $76 billion by 1970. Because of a more risk-averse regulatory framework up to 
the 1990s, public pensions for federal, state and local government workers remained primarily invested in fixed 
incomes such as bonds. Only after which, with encouragement from legislatures, have equities come to take up 
a larger share of portfolio allocations for government employees as well.18 
Total pension fund assets rose from a net worth of $26 billion in 1952 to $10.8 trillion in 2007 (see Figure 2). The 
pension plans of the private workforce grew to be the largest—from just $11 billion in 1952 to $6.3 trillion in 
2007. Pension funds for public employees grew from $15 billion in 1952 to $4.4 trillion in 2007. This growth was 
such that pension funds themselves can be more valuable than the companies that the future retirees work for. 
For instance, in September 2000 the pension fund at General Motors held assets worth nearly double the 
company’s.19 Private union funds represent about a fifth of total pension assets, which is currently mostly made 
up of nonunion 401(k)-type plans. In the 1950s and the 1960s union funds were the largest, but as defined-
contribution plans grew in the 1980s and 1990s they became marginalized. However, it would be wrong to 
suggest that they are unimportant today. As of 2012, union funds accounted for about $1.6 trillion in assets, 
which at about a tenth of GDP is hardly inconsequential. 
 
Figure 2. Pension Assets 1952 - 2009, in Billions of Dollars. 
(Author’s calculations from Board of Governors, 2010, and Department of Labor Form 5500, Table A6, 1993-
2009) 
 
As an early sign of the shift to “pension fund capitalism” underway, a new institutional investment industry 
emerged by the end of the 1950s. Institutional investors acted to provide sophisticated and long-term 
investment management for the assets of pension funds and other large tax-exempt institutions such as 
charitable foundations and college and university endowments.20 By the late 1970s, government-sponsored 
plans accounted for less than 40 percent of total fund assets. More than 60 percent was in the private sector. 
Nonetheless, only a small fraction of the plans in the private sector were subject to joint-control with unions—
about 10 percent. For the vast majority, executives hired institutional investors to manage the funds as 
fiduciaries.21 
Businesses were originally opposed to having collectively bargained pension plans. But if they had to they were 
determined to control the allocation of assets. And corporate executives decided early on that the best place to 
put the money was into financial speculation. In 1958, the NAM noted that “the process of amassing funds for 
financing retirement inherently results in great accumulations of capital from a source relatively new to financial 
history. Though the prime investment purpose of these funds is safety and assured income, it is of high 
importance that they contribute a creative element to our economy as well.”22 From the NAM’s perspective, 
indeed they did; they became a key source of equity for US businesses. By bolstering stock prices in the 
secondary market union pension funds ultimately drove up corporate credit ratings, opening doors to cheaper 
capital for US corporations. 
As a result, pensions became a critical pillar of US finance. In 1955 pension funds owned only 2.3 percent of total 
equity holdings, and insurance companies 3.2 percent. By 1997 pensions held 24 percent, and insurance 
companies 5.7 percent of total US holdings. Households held 93 percent of all US equity in 1945; this proportion 
dropped to 42.7 percent in 1997.23 This represents a critical transformation of the market for stocks in the 
United States. By the mid-1970s, when pension funds reached nearly a quarter of control of all US equity, stocks 
were no longer exclusively made up of the private savings of wealthy employers like the Rockefellers, the 
Morgans, or the Du Ponts. They weren’t even mostly the savings of millions of individual investors. Pension 
funds, administered by institutional investors, became the largest pool of equity investment anywhere in the 
world. 
Despite their size and economic importance, unions and their members lost out in the shift to equity 
investment. A 1979 study conducted by Corporate Data Exchange, Inc., analyzed the investments that a sample 
of 142 collectively bargained pension funds with total assets of $157 billion, including common stock worth $61 
billion, had in ninety-nine major US corporations at the end of 1976. The results showed that pension funds 
were financing anti-union firms. In total, 118 of those union funds held $12.6 billion in common stock in fifty 
non-union firms.24 In ten of those companies, unions owned a significant share of the total stock (see Figure 3). 
And in many cases, funds invested union pension money directly into companies that the same unions were 
unable to organize. The collectively bargained funds of the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the International 
Union of Electrical Workers owned $61 million in Texas Instruments’ stocks (2.6 percent of its stock) in 1976, a 
company that had successfully resisted organizing attempts from both unions for years.25 
 
Figure 3. Common Stock Ownership by 142 Union Pension Funds in Non-Union Companies, 1976. 
(Source: Editorial. “The Pension Power Unions Might Wield” Business Week. September 17, 1979. AFL-CIO 
Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1.) 
 
Furthermore, in 1980 the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department’s Committee on Benefit Funds issued a report 
that found that, “Large portions of the assets of these pension funds are used to furnish capital to build foreign 
plants.”26 According to the report, the assets of the ten largest industrial companies that they surveyed had 
funds that were heavily invested in firms with high overseas employment.27 When the report turned to an 
investigation of union pension funds they found a similar trend. Examining the fifteen largest investments of 
each of the funds, the report showed that five companies had at least half their assets invested in companies 
whose employment forces abroad represented at least 30 percent of their total employment.28 And as the trend 
of deindustrialization of America’s industrial heartland intensified in the late 1970s, more companies followed 
the lead of the biggest corporations such as Exxon, IBM, W.R. Grace, and Ford in investing overseas. By 1982, of 
the 1,600 largest US corporations, 17 percent invested pension funds in foreign enterprises, up from just 5 
percent in 1977.29 
The explanation for why fiduciaries allocated workers’ finance into anti-labor companies and companies with 
foreign work forces is straightforward. Firms with lower labor costs tended to have higher profit margins and 
were seen by fund managers as more likely to produce higher rates of return. The decision was purely financial. 
Longer-term considerations, how this might negatively affect US job growth or contribute to a race-to-the-
bottom in work standards, were simply ignored by corporate investors. But leaving the lack of social investing 
aside, even by their own definition of fiduciary prudence, the returns on the investments themselves were 
inconsistent. In the 1970s, pension investors had a substantially lower return on their investments than the 
stock market as a whole. These assets would have grown more in a savings account than in the hands of 
professional fiduciaries. Between 1966 and 1976, banks averaged a 4.4 percent rate of return on their pension 
fund investments. That is 33 percent less than the average rate of return for Standard & Poor’s 500 stock 
index.30 
In congressional hearings, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) said, “Without a question, those who manage 
pension funds are in a position to play a crucial role in determining the method and direction of the nation’s 
economic growth and development.”31 Yet most union firms invested their pension funds in the same ways as 
non-union firms. Using IRS Form 5500 between 1977 and 1984, Dorsey and Turner found that non-union- and 
union-negotiated single-employer pension plans had almost identical asset allocations in their portfolios. Both 
favored equity investment more than union negotiated multi-employer plans, in which fixed income 
investments accounted for a larger share of the portfolio.32 William Winpisinger, president of the International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), testified in congressional hearings that, “Responsible 
trade unionists have to conclude that they have been financing their own destruction … only tradition and a 
great con game have kept pension funds in the control of the private sector giants.”33 
However, most unions play little to no part in investment decisions. As early as 1954, out of a representative 
sample of 203 medium- to large-sized unionized companies, fewer than 10 percent had union representation on 
the pension committee and just 16 percent had employee representation. Company executives controlled the 
bulk of the private pension funds in the United States, and they hired fiduciaries to manage their 
portfolios.34 The committee, usually composed of three to fifty members, maintained general administrative 
powers over the pension funds within the firms. And over two decades later, according to an internal AFL-CIO 
study of a sample of twenty-eight international unions in 1980, “Almost universally, investment decisions are 
left up to investment advisors.”35 
Laws and Pension Fund Investment 
One possibility is that unions and their members lacked foresight or the technical confidence to make pension 
fund investment decisions. After all, the world of finance is highly complex and those that manage the funds are 
professionally trained, often at elite Ivy League schools. But that unions largely did not control their funds was 
not for a lack of effort on their part. Instead, developments in the legal regime governing private pension funds, 
such as the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and ERISA in 1974, limited labor’s ability to control them. In this section, I 
examine these laws and show how they fettered union control efforts. 
Unions made a large-scale push for fringe benefits immediately after the war.36 John L. Lewis of the United Mine 
Workers (UMW) set the benchmark by creating a pension and welfare fund financed by contributions of the coal 
industry on a pay-as-you-go basis. Lewis won the demand that it be financed according to output (10 cents a 
ton) rather than hours, so that the tremendous mechanization of the industry would not impair it.37 The 
settlement included exclusive union control over the fund. Spurred by the success of the UMW, large-scale 
strikes over pensions erupted in auto, steel, and other sectors of manufacturing. With pensions and other fringe 
benefits the main object of contention, the 1945-46 strike wave was the largest in US history to that point. But 
the strikes and President Truman’s pro-labor interventions, urging employers to adopt negotiated pension plans 
at a labor-management summit the White House organized in 1945, initially failed.38 
Between 1945 and 1947, the issue of pensions led to a deadlock in strike negotiations with employers refusing 
to budge. Even efforts by the ascendant UAW met with failure. In 1945 the UAW led a 113-day strike at General 
Motors. But Reuther and the union failed to win a negotiated pension plan and ended the strike with only small 
wage increases. In the same year, the USW took on U.S. Steel. Although Truman again intervened in support of 
the union, the strike once again ended in a stalemate over the issue of pensions. But the failure did not settle 
the question. Vice President of the USW, Clinton Golden, pushed the CIO leadership to bring joint industry-union 
cooperation to the front of its agenda. And in 1946, signaling its change in strategy, the CIO published Should 
Labor Have a Direct Share in Management? There Philip Murray, president of both the USW and the CIO, argued 
for a new kind of corporate governance in which employees and the union would take an active interest and 
role in firm affairs without interfering with management’s right to manage.39 
Despite labor’s push, the postwar period brought with it changes that undercut labor’s economic leverage over 
firms. First, returning soldiers flooded the labor market. Second, and more importantly, the decline in demand 
for wartime goods made employers willing to shut down operations, letting stock and equipment sit idle, rather 
than make large pension concessions to labor. During the strike wave employers rarely hired replacement 
workers.40 But the success of the UMW to win control of their fund, the pro-labor posture of the Truman 
Administration, and a general union interest in establishing pension funds was enough to spur an ascendant 
right into political action. Employers’ associations such as the Chamber of Commerce and the NAM were 
inclined to keep pensions outside of the scope of collective bargaining altogether.41 But if more unions did 
eventually win them, the second order preference of business was to control the flow of assets.42 So establishing 
new laws that blocked potential union control proved a fail-safe plan for firms and conservative policy makers. 
The Taft-Hartley Act 
Republicans won both houses of Congress between 1947 and 1949, the first time they had done so since 1931. 
The conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats argued that union pension fund control 
would set a dangerous precedent for the country. In Congressional testimony on the anti-labor Case Bill in 1946, 
Senator Harry F. Byrd (D-Virginia) stated, “I am endeavoring to strike against the attempt of representatives of 
labor to use such payments in establishing funds over which no one but the labor representative would have any 
control. I assert that if such a condition were allowed to take place, labor unions would become so powerful that 
no organized government would be able to deal with them.”43 
Although Truman vetoed the Case Bill, Republicans and Southern Democrats found another opportunity to block 
labor control in the Taft-Hartley Act. While the act famously rolled back labor rights with provisions concerning 
secondary boycotts, right-to-work states, and noncommunist affidavits, it also laid the groundwork for the 
modern regulatory apparatus concerning occupational pensions. Several provisions curbing labor power, 
including those that regulated welfare funds, were won in committee. On the issue of fund control, The House 
Committee on Education and Labor concluded in its statement on the bill that, “Certainly, it is not in the national 
interest for union leaders to control these great, unregulated, untaxed funds derived from exactions upon 
employers.”44 Pro-labor voices in the Congressional debate, such as Senators Morse (R-Oregon) and Pepper (D-
Florida), countered, arguing that such a rule would hinder the expansion of welfare funds and that many 
employers did not want the responsibility of administering these funds in the first place.45 But despite 
opposition, coming in no small part from unions themselves, the bill finally passed with welfare fund provisions 
May 13, 1947 on a roll call vote of 68 to 24 with a majority of Democratic support from the Southern wing of the 
party.46 
Section 302 of the act makes it illegal to “pay, lend, or deliver…any money or other thing of value” to a union 
representative. Since this would prohibit employers from contributing to a pension fund established by a union, 
Taft-Hartley includes, as an exception, contributions that are administered with, or controlled exclusively by, the 
employer.47 In practice, this provision requires that management representatives comprise at least 50 percent of 
the board of trustees for pension plans. 
According to Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio), “The occasion of the amendment was the demand made by the 
United Mine Workers of America that a tax of 10 cents a ton be levied on all coal mined, and that the tax so 
levied be paid into a general fund to be administered by the union for practically any purpose the union 
considered to come within the term ‘welfare.’ Of course, the result of such a proceeding, if there is no 
restriction, is to build up a tremendous fund in the hands of the officers of the labor union…which they may use 
indiscriminately.” Taft went on to say, “The tendency is to demand a welfare fund as much in the power of the 
union as possible. Certainly unless we impose some restrictions we shall find that the welfare fund will become 
merely a war chest for the particular union, and that the employees for whose benefit it is supposed to be 
established, for certain welfare purposes, will have no legal rights.”48 In determining who would control workers’ 
finance, Taft’s regulation strengthened the capacities of firms and weakened those of unions. But the law had 
gaps that allowed for some union control. 
Variation in Union Control After Taft-Hartley 
After Taft-Hartley was passed, union capacity to influence investment decisions greatly depended on the 
structure of collective bargaining in the respective industry. Unions either bargain directly with single, large 
employers on behalf of the employer’s employees, or bargaining is industry-wide, between many small 
employers and the union-represented employees of an industry. In the former case, single-employer pension 
plans are the norm. Here fund management is the responsibility of one firm and one union. In the latter 
case, multi-employer plans emerge where fund management is the responsibility of many small employers and 
one, typically large, union. 
Within the over 500,000 separate plans that existed by the early 1970s, those that organized retirement income 
through multi-employer plans, which accounted for the minority, provided more legal room for union influence. 
This greater capacity is explained by the Taft-Hartley law, which ruled that employers had to control half or 
more of the pension board seats. In single-employer plans, this rule largely cut off the possibility of union 
control. However, it left plenty of room for influence in the multi-employer plans. While employer trustees 
represented different interests and were at times divided, union trustees were united; as a result, union trustees 
on joint-administered multi-employer boards had more capacity to influence pension investment policy.49 As the 
NAM noted in the early 1950s, “administration of employee benefits by the employee’s collective bargaining 
agent appears to develop when the union is the dominant force in the entire industry or some geographical 
portion of it.”50 
According to a 1961 report from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, investment decisions on all multi-employer 
plans were made jointly between union and employer representatives while the employer typically retained 
decision-making power in single-employer plans (see Table 1). This trend, which persisted two decades later, 
bore on the kinds of investment decisions that fund managers made. In a 1980 AFL-CIO survey of their member 
unions, the funds of the building and construction trades, mining, and transportation (all relying on multi-
employer plans) were more likely to be invested in union projects or mortgage loans than common stocks. While 
some of these unions invested in the Union Labor Life Insurance Company’s (est. 1925) J for Jobs Program and 
the AFL-CIO Mortgage Investment Trust, most of the unconventional investments were intended by union 
leaders to directly benefit the particular union and its members. 
Table 1. BLS Survey of 100 Union Plans, 1961. 
Who determines who makes 
investment decisions? 
Single-Employer Plans Multi-Employer Plans 
Employers 61 0 
Jointly 1 38 
Who makes investment decisions?   
Delegated to money manager 53 9 
Employers 9 0 
Jointly 0 29 
(Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin, “Digest of One-Hundred Selected Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining.” Bulletin No. 1307. Summer 1961.) 
The case of the Teamsters’ Central States Pension Fund (CSPF) illustrates how unions with multi-employer funds 
had more capacity to control them. In 1955 Teamster President Jimmy Hoffa built the CSPF. By 1985, the fund 
had $2.2 billion in assets. Hoffa wanted to consolidate the fund into a single massive pool of money for all 
Teamster unions, but some 230 funds remained independent. Following the rules laid out in Taft-Hartley, the 
CSPF had six union and six employer trustees. But the number of trustees was the main point of division 
between the union and the employers in the setup of the fund. The labor relations director of the American 
Trucking Association (the employers’ industry association), Ben Miller, represented the employers’ interests in 
negotiations. He advocated for a smaller board with employer representatives only selected from the collective 
agreements that established the plan. A smaller board with employers from the employers’ association would 
ensure greater unanimity on the business side of the table in votes over investment decisions. However, Hoffa 
insisted on a larger board that included representation from “independent” employers who were not in the 
association, some of whom were personal friends. 
After several months of negotiation, with the employers still refusing to include the independents on a larger 
board, Hoffa convinced them by threatening to strike. In a meeting over the issue in 1955 he said, “Representing 
the union, we will file a grievance against every carrier, every one, and we will take you out on strike, God damn 
it, until you do agree to draw up the proper kind of trust that we can live under. I can tell you that much, and I 
will, God damn it. Take that home, and see how you like it.”51 Shortly thereafter, Ben Miller and the employers 
capitulated to Hoffa’s demand for a sixth and independent trustee. 
With the addition of an independent employer on the board, Hoffa was often able to get his way; decisions were 
made by simple majority.52 As a result, the Teamsters’ fund portfolio was almost exclusively invested in trustee-
selected mortgages (typically real estate and casinos that used union labor) within a few years of its 
establishment (see Figure 4). This is a clear break from standard industry practice, where total pension fund 
investment in mortgages rose from just 1.4 percent in 1956 to 3.2 percent in 1962. 
 
Figure 4. Central States Pension Fund Investments, 1956–1962. 
(Source: James & James 1965) 
 
Before moving on to a discussion of the impact of ERISA on union funds—both multi-employer like the 
Teamsters but also single-employer—a qualification needs to be made. Although union fund control is a 
necessary condition for union members to be able to democratically allocate their own finance it is not sufficient 
to ensure either that the funds will actually be allocated democratically or that they will break with the 
investment logic of corporate finance. In the former case, it’s likely that if the union itself is undemocratic then 
the way the funds are allocated will be as well. For the latter, we have already seen that unions that controlled 
their pension funds were more likely to incorporate social factors into their investment decisions and tended to 
be interested in making investments that not only allowed them to meet future obligations to retirees but also 
created jobs in their sectors and for their members. Of course, it’s no guarantee that unions will actually break 
with the corporate investment logic. And it’s certainly not a guarantee that unions will make sound investments, 
whatever the criteria. After all, the Teamsters fund itself was invested in casinos with clear mob ties. But the 
conditions under which they do or do not are beyond the scope of this study. The critical point is that most 
unions and union members didn’t have the chance to forge their own history either way. Instead, they were 
blocked from the outset from being able to freely assess and choose their investment options. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
The 1974 legislation added another layer of legal constraints on fund administrators. Taft-Hartley included a 
provision that pension investments had to be made for the “exclusive benefit” of plan beneficiaries—a notion 
that has come to be known as the “prudent person rule” and which dates to common law doctrine in the mid-
nineteenth century. Up to the mid-twentieth century, most American states adopted legal statutes that 
mandated investment into fixed bonds. This earlier interpretation held that prudence is the absence of 
speculation and high risk. This understanding of prudence, however, changed in the 1950s. In 1950, General 
Motors proposed to direct the investments of its new pension fund into equities instead of bonds. Executives 
argued that they would overcome increased risk by diversifying the investments, which in part changed standard 
investment practices for fiduciaries.53 
ERISA, signed into law by President Ford, made this version of prudence a federal legal guideline. ERISA is the 
only comprehensive private benefits legislation ever passed in the United States. Among a number of vesting, 
funding, and eligibility requirements intended to make private pensions more secure, it also established federal 
fiduciary standards against which courts could measure the actions of fund managers.54 According to ERISA 
Section 404(a)(1), fiduciaries must act, “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances 
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the 
conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like aims.”55 
But not only did ERISA reinforce the prudent person rule, it also made it more restrictive. Some social investing 
advocates argued that the pre-ERISA rule required the fiduciary to weigh nontraditional objectives that may be 
in the beneficiaries’ broader interest.56 But according to Ian D. Lanoff, former administrator of the Office of 
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs in the US Department of Labor, 1980-1981, “what the pension plan 
fiduciary needs to determine about an investment is not, first, whether it is socially good or bad but how the 
proposed investment will serve the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.”57 The law allows consideration of 
nontraditional objectives only after establishing that the investment should obtain the highest rate of return for 
a given level of risk.58 This constrained fiduciary decision making and union efforts to control funds. 
Principally, ERISA made fiduciaries even more inclined to follow financial investment trends in the corporate 
sector. A 1977 study, conducted by the nonprofit International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans—which 
represented more than 1,900 pension fund trustees, administrators, and advisors from all regions of the 
country—found that a large majority of fiduciaries, 83 percent, said that ERISA has made them less willing to 
invest in anything but “blue chip” securities.59 It also reined in the control efforts of unions with multi-employer 
funds. 
In 1976, after ERISA was passed, in part because of the controversy surrounding the management of the 
Teamsters’ fund itself, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) found the CSPF’s investment practices to be in 
violation of the prudent person rule and revoked the tax status of the plan. According to a Forbes reporter at the 
time, “By conventional [legal] standards, the Teamsters’ Central States Pensions Funds was a fiduciary 
nightmare.”60 The government then imposed a number of requirements on the fund, including forcibly removing 
many of the union trustees. In June 1977, the IRS appointed Equitable Life Insurance as the principle asset 
manager and gave Victor Palmieri & Co. the responsibility of managing the CSPF’s real estate assets west of the 
Mississippi.61 This appointment led to an immediate shift in the CSPF’s pension investment practices, from a 
portfolio heavily based on real estate and bonds, to one organized around common stock investments 
(see Figure 5). The CSPF violated two widely held markers of prudence: diversification and majority investment 
in common stocks. 
 
Figure 5. Central States Pension Fund Investments, 1977 & 1979. 
(Source: James Cook. “The Most Abused, Misused Pension Fund in America.” Forbes. November 10, 1980. 69-82. 
AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1.) 
 
Prior to ERISA, the ability of the Teamsters and other unions with multi-employer funds to control financial flows 
was due to multi-employer bargaining in their industries. Because Taft-Hartley mandated that unions comprise 
no more than fifty percent of the board of trustees, those unions that were most able to influence fund policy 
were predominately in industry-wide collective bargaining agreements with many small employers. After the 
passage of ERISA, however, the federal government regulated the investment practices of these unions with a 
stronger arm; in the Teamsters union this resulted in punitive legal action against union leaders that served as a 
demonstration to the labor movement not to deviate from fiduciary norms.62 
The impact of ERISA is also reflected in the response of other unions. A 1980 AFL-CIO survey of member unions 
concluded “whatever enthusiasm there was for taking on non-financial objectives—whether for employment or 
other social objectives—was tempered by the ‘prudent’ judgment that union trustees must first meet financial 
objectives.” When the survey asked the union leaders if they would consider social objectives in developing 
pension fund investment policy, “without exception they agreed—in fact, emphasized—that the first duty of the 
union trustees is to protect the integrity of the funds, managing them in such a way as to get the greatest 
possible return, consistent with the other imperatives of prudent investment.” Many of the officials in the 
sample balked at the idea of influencing corporate policy through pension fund investment strategies because 
the law made the pursuit of this objective inconsistent with their fiduciary responsibilities.63 
Carter’s Suppressed Historical Alternative 
Regulatory laws, and the power of the conservative coalition to keep those laws in place, largely explain why 
most unions were unable to gain control of their pension funds (and why some actually did). Variation in union 
capacity to do so along bargaining structure and the effect of ERISA to clamp down on unions with multi-
employer plans points us to this conclusion. But does this mean that restrictive laws foreclosed all possibilities to 
create union-run retirement funds? In Injustice, Barrington Moore observed that “history may often contain 
suppressed possibilities and alternatives obscured or obliterated by the deceptive wisdom of hindsight.”64 In the 
United States, Carter’s failed reindustrialization policy in the late 1970s is one such “suppressed historical 
alternative.” 
The Failed Economic Revitalization Plan 
By the late 1970s, as deindustrialization and deunionization intensified, many member unions of the AFL-CIO 
revisited the issue of pension fund control with new enthusiasm. Unions were well aware of corporate misuse of 
pension funds, their investment in anti-labor corporations and in overseas ventures, and their unimpressive 
rates of return. There was a strong sense among many leaders that they had erred by giving the issue 
insufficient attention for the better part of the past thirty years. In 1978, this culminated in the publication 
of The North Will Rise Again, by Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber, which served as a call to arms and laid a 
strategy for Northern reindustrialization and union revitalization with targeted union-run investing.65 Already, a 
number of building trades unions with multi-employer plans were taking innovative approaches to their funds 
and pushing the broader labor movement to do the same. At the time Jacob Sheinkman, secretary-treasurer of 
one such union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, noted that, 
The massive sums accumulated in pension fund assets are often used against the direct economic 
interests of the workers in whose name the funds were created. The banks and insurance companies in 
charge of such funds, under agreements with sponsoring companies or labor unions, have used them in 
ways that foster and even hasten the flight of jobs and capital to the largely unorganized areas of the 
“Sunbelt” or overseas. The “money managers” would say they are seeking a better business climate, but 
almost invariably the pension fund assets—in effect, billions of dollars of deferred wages of American 
workers—end up subsidizing a climate hostile to workers.66 
At its biennial meeting in November 1979, the 13th AFL-CIO convention adopted a resolution to investigate the 
ways unions could influence the investment process, noting that investments were not benefitting union 
members or the US economy.67 A year later it published a report arguing that labor should increase its 
participation in fund management. With greater control of investment flows, the federation hoped to counter 
rises in unemployment through reindustrialization, increase worker influence over firms as collective 
shareholders, disinvest money from anti-labor firms, and promote socially responsible investing.68 The union 
leadership urged their member unions to assign their pension assets to financial institutions whose investment 
policies were consistent with the interests of “working Americans.”69 At the time, Stanley Rothenburg, a pension 
fund consultant hired by the AFL-CIO said, “This is a major departure from the federation’s approach in the 
past.”70 
According to Congressional testimony by Harry B. Schecter, director of the Office of Housing and Monetary 
Policy within AFL-CIO, “This situation must be turned around and that is the purpose of the recommendations of 
the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO which stem from the report and the work of the Executive Council 
Committee. The major goals of those recommendations are—by enhancing union participation in pension fund 
management—to use these funds for expanding employment, advancing social purposes such as worker 
housing, improving the ability of workers through their union to exercise shareholder rights and withholding 
pension fund investment from companies hostile to workers’ rights.”71 To do so, simply put, required legal 
reform. 
Prior to the late 1970s, Democrats from the North were supportive of collective bargaining over pensions but 
largely silent on the issue of investment control. Truman had intervened in several labor-management disputes 
after World War II on behalf of unions striking for collectively bargained pensions. With pensions the key source 
of conflict between firms and unions in 1945, Truman said to an audience of top labor and business leaders that, 
“The history of labor relations has proven that nearly all labor disputes can and should be settled through 
sincere and honest collective bargaining. The vast majority of those disputes which are not adjusted by collective 
bargaining are settled through government conciliation.”72 Ultimately Truman pushed his agencies, such as the 
National Labor Relations Board, and task forces, such as the Steel Industry Board, to take an activist approach to 
disputes over retirement plans. Their decisions in 1948 and a subsequent Supreme Court ruling laid the legal 
ground work for collectively bargained retirement plans.73 
But Northern Democrats took the idea that employers would be in charge of investment decisions for granted. 
This is evident in the fact that they supported proposals in both the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA that actually 
made it more difficult for unions to control the allocation of funds.74 Despite instances of unions demanding 
control prior to the passage of Taft-Hartley and the case of the multi-employer funds where it was a regular aim, 
Northern Democratic economic policy did not actively challenge the legal barriers to a federation-wide effort to 
influence fund investment decisions. 
This changed, however, in the buildup to the 1980 Presidential election between Reagan and Carter. After a 
period of uneasy relations with labor, Carter needed union support in 1978 when he began to gear up for 
reelection. The AFL-CIO’s support for Carter was crucial in the barely won 1976 election against Ford. After the 
election, New York Times labor beat reporter, A. H. Raskin, wrote of the federation’s support that, “A top-level 
Presidential campaign endorsement usually adds a few percentage points to the margin when the majority of 
the membership starts out liking the same candidate as the officialdom; similarly, an endorsement reduces the 
margin a bit when the tide is running in the opposite direction.”75 
But the rapprochement with the administration was rattled during the Democratic primary. Early pledges of 
support indicated that large segments of labor were backing Senator Ted Kennedy, a leading figure in the party’s 
liberal wing from a solidly union state, Massachusetts. Kennedy received endorsements from several national 
unions, such as the UAW and the IAM. While a few labor leaders, like J. C. Turner of the Operating Engineers, 
supported Carter from the beginning, the AFL-CIO executive remained initially neutral. 
After Lane Kirkland was elected president of the federation in 1979, Carter found an eager ally. Kirkland was 
intent on rebuilding the relationship with the Democrats that they formed in the New Deal period, which had 
been strained under the George Meany presidency. To signal his interest, Kirkland offered to help the 
administration tackle the issue of inflation. According to a memo from Deputy Chief of Staff Landon Butler, “In 
April and May, 1979, Lane Kirkland told me privately that he was prepared to enter into a ‘social contract’ with 
the Carter Administration. Lane pointed out that the Callaghan government’s social contract in England involved 
specific questions on policy questions in return for the cooperation of British trade unions in a voluntary wage 
guideline program.” 76 The negotiations resulted in a “National Accord” between labor and the administration, 
which included the formation of a fifteen-member tripartite board that would provide assistance to 
policymakers in formulating wage guidelines to deal with the inflation problem. AFL-CIO spokesman Allen Zack 
said, “It is quite a historic document. It’s about as far as you can go toward a social contract here in the US 
without a parliamentary system. Never before has the legitimate role of the labor movement been recognized in 
such a way.”77 
When Kennedy failed to win the primary and the AFL-CIO Executive Committee came out in support of Carter, 
most of the labor movement shifted into a position of active support for reelection. This mattered critically for 
the campaign, even though in the end it was a failure. As one Carter aide observed of union activists, “They’re 
probably the most important group in Democratic Party politics. No other group in the Democratic Party has the 
money. When you get into voter registration, that’s who you go to. And these groups get involved in the 
primaries.”78 But union density fell to just above 20 percent in 1979, roughly what it was in 1940. So it can’t be 
denied that had labor been stronger it might have been able to sway the election in favor of Carter and his 
policy proposals. 
During the campaign, Carter’s key domestic economic policy proposed to expand basic industries to counter 
deindustrialization. On August 28, 1980, he announced his economic revitalization plan to great fanfare within 
his party, which included $3 billion worth of loans, grants, and interest subsidies to distressed areas in 1981 and 
1982; $350 million for retraining and relocation programs for workers in declining industries; a targeted 
investment tax credit for investments in distressed areas; and $1 billion for programs in high unemployment 
areas. President Reagan’s eventual alternative would be to lower taxes, creating “enterprise zones” out of areas 
experiencing severe deindustrialization.79 
Carter also had appointed a Commission on Pension Policy, to conduct a thorough analysis of the retirement 
system in 1978, and incorporated the idea of a tripartite Economic Revitalization Board into his broad program, 
a policy recommendation of the AFL-CIO’s Executive Committee. He appointed AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland 
to serve as a chairman on the board, which would invest pension assets for reindustrialization purposes by 
granting guarantees for a minimum level of return to pension funds that participate.80 In his words, Carter 
wanted the board to recommend an industrial development authority to channel resources—including pension 
assets—“to help revitalize American industry in areas most affected by economic dislocations or by industrial 
bottlenecks.”81 By pointing to alternative objectives besides the rate of return, the Carter Administration 
explicitly advocated a developmental policy that both reformed the laws that had blocked labor control and 
created new institutions that incorporated union influence into retirement investment decisions.82 
The plan garnered significant support within the party. At the Democratic National Convention in August of 
1980, Governor Jerry Brown of California said, “It is time to redirect the vast pension funds of this nation to 
more socially responsible objectives.”83 Brown created a Public Investment Task Force to investigate how state 
pension funds could be used to invest back in the state itself for purpose of creating jobs. Other Democratic 
politicians followed the example of California and took similar initiatives in Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, 
and New Jersey.84 
Labor actively campaigned for the plan. According to President Lane Kirkland, “What is being contemplated, and 
supported by the AFL-CIO, is the establishment of an industrial development authority which would appeal to 
pension funds through attractive interest rates and loan guarantees and the assurance that they would be 
devoted to the support and expansion of jobs in this country. Under this proposal, pension fund capital would be 
available for such vitally needed projects as rail road improvement to move our manufactured goods and 
agriculture, harbor expansion to facilitate exports, synthetic fuel development to help our nation obtain energy 
independence, and the modernization of our manufacturing and other facilities.”85 Larry Smedley, of the AFL-
CIO Department of Social Security said that, “fund investment effort will be aimed at greater emphasis on job 
creation through investments that will help modernize industries in depressed areas and encourage industrial 
growth, as well as produce solid earnings on investments.”86 
But plans for the Economic Revitalization Board were scrapped when Reagan won the presidency. Instead, 
Reagan initiated his alternative, cutting taxes to spur and maintain production in the United States, a plan that 
failed in hindsight. After the electoral defeat, the president’s commission was unable to give a clear set of policy 
recommendations in its final report in 1981. And over the next decade, Northern Democrats shifted away from 
the policy of targeted pension fund investments for reindustrialization. The last time Carter’s economic 
revitalization plan was advocated by the party was when Walter Mondale won the Democratic nomination for 
the presidency in 1984. But again, Reagan won. Under the Clinton presidency hardly a word was mentioned of 
union pension fund investments as a means to domestic growth. 
The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill 
It is a mistake to conclude that the economic revitalization plan would have succeeded had Carter won 
reelection against Reagan. Surely, history would have unfolded quite differently with a moderate in the White 
House, but it’s doubtful that the plan would have made it through the legislative process unscathed, given the 
broader market-oriented policy shift underway and the weakening of unions at the bargaining table. The 
alternative was suppressed because of social reasons that ran deeper than the outcome of the election alone. 
The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill, passed when Carter was in office, suggests that in all likelihood the economic 
revitalization plan would have failed regardless of which party controlled the executive. The bill provides a 
useful counterfactual comparison for what might have been had Carter been reelected and his developmental 
plan attempted. 
After a minor recession in 1971, in 1974 the American economy went into an economic slump. The crisis spurred 
public discontent over the Ford Administration’s economic policy and a number of legislative initiatives by the 
liberals in Congress, the most successful of which was the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill. The original version of the 
bill, proposed in 1974, aimed to achieve full employment. It rejected the common definition, the level of 
employment at which inflation begins to rise according to the Phillips Curve, in favor of a situation where there 
were as many vacant jobs as individuals looking for and able to work.87 The bill was a strong Keynesian response 
to the crisis. It made full employment a goal within eighteen months of passage, required the president to 
submit an annual report to Congress to keep the administration to task, and, most controversially, granted the 
legal right to work and wage provisions for the public jobs it created. But it faced opposition from business 
organizations, Republicans, and the moderate Democrats that were elected in Republican districts after the 
Watergate scandal.88 
Humphrey-Hawkins had the support of unions like the UAW, the USW, the United Electrical Workers, the 
American Federation of Teachers, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Workers, the 
International Association of Machinists, and the United Farm Workers. Murray Finley, of the Amalgamated 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, had taken an early interest in the bill through his co-chairmanship of the 
National Committee for Full Employment with Coretta Scott King.89 But the leadership of the AFL-CIO, opposed 
to the legally enforceable right to a job and wage and price controls, came out against Representative Augustus 
Hawkins’ original proposal.90 
Just nine months after the bill was introduced unemployment had climbed from 5.2 percent to 8.7 percent. And 
by the end of 1975, with pressure coming from the rank and file of the organization, George Meany was pushed 
to meet with the Congressional Black Congress to overcome their policy differences. The version that the AFL-
CIO leadership eventually agreed on dropped the legal right to a job, extended the goal deadline to four years, 
and made the creation of public jobs a “last resort.” The federation preferred investment into private domestic 
industries. The new bill met outright hostility from the Ford Administration. Ford and his advisors, taking their 
cue from the testimony of the Federal Reserve and business associations, were worried that reducing 
unemployment would drive up inflation. And once elected in 1977, Carter took a similar position on the advice 
of the head of his Council of Economic Advisors, Charles Schultze. Despite public support, there was a 
widespread concern among the bill’s long list of opponents that it would draw capital away from productive 
investments in the private sector in favor of unproductive investments in government jobs.91 
Although it became a part of the Democratic Party platform in 1976 when it was reintroduced, it’s not surprising 
that by the time it was passed in 1978, with Carter’s support, it had gone through several rounds of revision. The 
unemployment goal was increased from three to four percent by 1983 (in that year unemployment was almost 
11 percent) and the option for public jobs was largely removed. Provisions were also included that prioritized 
anti-inflationary measures over the goal of employment, essentially changing the bill’s very purpose and 
subduing its Keynesianism. The final version included numerical targets to reduce inflation to 3 percent by 1983 
(a goal that was achieved) and zero percent by 1988.92 When it came to lowering unemployment the bill that 
was passed lacked any meaningful enforcement mechanism and as a result was almost immediately ignored and 
violated. Despite the fact that Carter was in office, progressives had to backtrack on their goal of full 
employment. All things being equal, the economic revitalization plan would have likely faced a similar fate if 
Carter had been reelected. 
Like the Full Employment Bill, the fate of the economic revitalization plan highlights the deeper shift toward 
market-oriented policies during that period in the United States. Without legal reforms that cut in the other 
direction, unions were forced to retreat on the issue of pension fund control. During the years that followed the 
failed Carter reelection, unions did create a variety of investment funds, such as the Housing Investment Trust 
(est. 1983), which were consistent with the aims they had laid out in 1980. However, these were financed 
primarily by the jointly run multi-employer funds, not the single-employer funds that held the bulk of US 
pension assets, and were never large enough to have much of an impact.93 As the Quebec case shows, a 
stronger and mobilized union federation in combination with the political success of a nationalist and social 
democratic party made financial reforms in the retirement system possible. 
Quebec’s Solidarity Fund 
The creation of Quebec’s Solidarity Fund contrasts sharply with Carter’s failed revitalization plan. As in the 
United States, unions across Canada in the late 1970s began to show an increased interest in the way pension 
funds were invested. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the central labor federation in Canada, even passed a 
resolution at their 1986 convention “endors[ing] the goal of organized Canadian workers achieving greater 
control and direction of the investment of pension funds.”94 Also like the United States, unions in Canada were 
largely unsuccessful at achieving control. Yet, provincially, by creating a new type of pensioning instrument 
based on labor control, Quebec is an outlier. Quebec, which represents about one-fourth of the entire Canadian 
population and had a union density rate around 40 percent in this period, was the first province to establish a 
union-run labor-sponsored investment fund (LSIF) to pool retirement savings and redirect financial flows.95 
LSIFs are not the same as traditional collectively bargained funds. Quebec unions, like those in the United States, 
were also unsuccessful at controlling traditional funds because of legal barriers similar to those in Taft-Hartley 
and ERISA; Canadian court rulings on pension fund investment issues took their cue from US legal 
precedents.96 Instead, LSIFs are more like mutual funds or 401(k)s, with individuals choosing whether or not they 
want to make the investment in them and deferring their returns on those investments until retirement 
age.97 But unlike US mutual funds or 401(k)s, which unions have no control over in the United States, 
the Fédération des trailailleurs et traivailleuses du Québec (FTQ), Quebec’s largest union federation, runs the 
Solidarity Fund. 
Since 1983, the Solidarity Fund has had a significant impact on Quebec’s development. With the massive 
infusion of equity though workers’ contributions, by the early 1990s, the fund was estimated to have created 
23,000 new jobs through approximately 100 distinct investments in local firms.98 And by 2012, the fund had 
created 86,624 jobs and maintained or protected 81,993 more.99 Due to the success of the fund at generating 
provincial growth, LSIFs have become more common in provinces beyond Quebec.100 Although many of the 
funds outside of Quebec are less explicitly pro-union, they also represent risk capital that meets investment gaps 
in the market for small- to medium-sized firms in the given province, and if the fund is specialized, particular 
sectors of the economy.101 By the 2000s, LSIFs provided nearly one-half of the all venture capital in Canada.102 In 
comparison to their US counterparts, then, how did the FTQ come to establish and control the Solidarity Fund? 
While Carter’s plan was stifled, the FTQ was able to achieve fund control both because of the rise and success of 
the Parti Québécois (PQ), a social democratic party that advocated separation from Anglo Canada, and because 
of its larger size and importance in provincial politics. By the 1970s, the FTQ cut its political ties to the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) and its leader, Louis Laberge, penned, Un Seul Front (The Only Front), which called for 
political action to out the Liberals in support of the PQ. According to the FTQ, the PQ was “the party closest to 
the interest of the workers.”103 As a result FTQ members voted overwhelmingly for PQ candidates, they staffed 
its local political offices and outreach programs, and financed its political campaigns.104 
For its part, the PQ proposed legal reforms that gave unions more control over investment. Rene Lévesque, the 
leader of the party, wrote in Foreign Affairs that, “The dominant position in our repatriated financial circuit 
would be handed over to Québec’s cooperative institutions, which happen to be particularly well developed in 
that very field, and, being strongly organized on a regional basis, would afford our population a decent chance 
for better-balanced, responsible, democratic development. And that, by the way, is just one fundamental aspect 
of the kind of evolution toward a new economic democracy, from the lowest rung in the marketplace up to the 
board-room levels, which all advanced societies that are not already doing so had better start thinking about in 
the very near future.”105 
When the PQ won the elections in 1976, it shifted domestic policy in a more social democratic direction and 
targeted investments into the province in preparation for independence. It strengthened the role of the existing 
governing agencies to further support Quebec enterprises, created the Société de developpement de 
l’enterprise to provide more capital for small- and medium-sized firms, created a preferential buying scheme 
using the provincial government’s purchasing power to build up Quebec firms, and designed an “industrial 
recovery fund” to provide further aid to businesses in need. These economic development policies were 
elaborated on in its report, Challenges for Quebec, which it published in 1979. The report offered a “new social 
contract” based on a corporatist model of state-led development, encouraging the coordination of activities 
between business and labor, not unlike Carter’s failed plan. It also outlined the different forms of aid the 
government would make available to the private sector, such as investment assistance and technical and 
financial help.106 To implement its agenda, the PQ held annual tripartite summits with labor and francophone 
capital and it created the Conseil économique et social (CES), a corporatist body that made developmental policy 
recommendations. 
In the early 1980s, however, the developmental project came under the strain of an economic recession. The 
FTQ, under the active leadership of Louis Laberge, put its full attention on plant closures and deindustrialization 
in the private sector. At a tripartite summit in 1982, the FTQ argued that through the targeted provincial 
investments of a pension fund made of voluntary contributions, the union could help keep existing jobs and 
create new ones, again similar to Carter’s plan. The major outcome of this proposal was the creation of the 
Solidarity Fund in 1983, when the PQ passed Bill 192.107 With the FTQ named sole sponsor, the new law set out 
four objectives for the fund: (1) to invest in firms whose total assets were less than $50 million or net assets no 
greater than $20 million, (2) to promote worker training, (3) to stimulate the Quebec economy, and (4) to bring 
workers into the fund through very generous tax credits.108 By 2013, the Solidarity Fund had net assets of $8.8 
billion.109 
In the United States, Carter’s economic revitalization plan would have challenged interpretations of the 
“prudent person rule” that only emphasize rate of return. But given the timing there was small hope in it 
actually being implemented. In the midst of the Reagan revolution, which was actually underway before he took 
office, the plan was Keynesianism’s dying gasp rather than a real contender as an alternative economic policy. 
When the plan failed, unions were forced to again retreat on the issue of targeted investments of pension 
finance. Alternatively, in Quebec, the policies of the PQ emphasized corporatist development and targeted 
investments into the provincial economy. The rise of Quebec nationalism and a strong union federation made 
these legal reforms possible and resulted in the creation of the union-run Solidarity Fund. 
Conclusion 
If “socialism” is defined as “ownership of the means of production by the workers”…then the United 
States is the first truly “Socialist” country. Through their pension funds, employees of American business 
today own at least 25 percent of its equity capital, which is more than enough for control…Only in the 
United States are the employees through their pension funds also becoming legal owners, the suppliers 
of capital, and the controlling force in the capital market.110 
When management consultant and author Peter Drucker penned these words in the mid-1970s he miscalculated 
his conclusion. American workers were not the “controlling force in the capital market.”111 While pension fund 
investments accounted for nearly 25 percent of all US corporate equity by the mid-1970s and totaled more than 
$10 trillion by the 2000s, American unions, on balance, were unable to exert much control over them. And it was 
not for lack of effort: unions have made major attempts to control pension fund investment since the 
emergence of collectively bargained pensions in the postwar period. But as this article shows, unions were 
fettered by legal constraints. 
These suppressed control attempts offer comparative historical insight into the recent debate on financial 
restructuring. The Great Recession of 2008 highlights the urgent need to channel financial flows in the United 
States toward more productive social ends. A new New Deal might be possible if finance can be directed into 
new energy technologies, transportation systems, infrastructure, and skill training.112 But because financial flows 
remain managed by elites pursuing the bottom line, such a restructuring has not been possible and remains 
unlikely. Failed attempts by unions to control their collectively bargained pension funds make clear that legal 
regulations are central to both the rise of corporate-controlled workers’ finance and the inability of working 
people to redirect their financial assets since the crisis. 
Laws—their passage and the inability of unions to reform them—explain why there is no union pension fund 
control in the United States. The Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974 imposed constraints on unions’ abilities to make investment decisions. The provision in Taft-
Hartley that limited union control to no more than half of pension boards was explicitly included to preempt 
efforts by unions at the time. While multi-employer unions with industry-wide collective bargaining agreements 
were left with greater capacity to influence funds, the general effect was union retreat on the issue. But after 
ERISA was passed in 1974, in part because of the large controversies generated by union-controlled boards, 
even these multi-employer funds were hampered by the legislation’s stricter interpretation of the “prudent 
person rule,” which treats diversified investments primarily into stocks as a marker of fiduciary duty. While 
reregulation, such as a return to Glass-Steagall, is widely acknowledged as a necessary postcrisis step to 
sustainable recovery, regulations of a different sort explain why unions couldn’t popularize control of pension 
finance in the first place. 
But the story would be incomplete if left at this. In addition to the legal constraints that labor faced, unions also 
lacked the power to reform them. In the run-up to the presidential election between Reagan and Carter in 1980, 
the Democratic Party, both at the national level and the state level, promoted targeted pension investments as 
way to achieve reindustrialization in order to shore up voter support against the Republican alternative. Unions, 
eager to revisit the issue of fund control because of the anti-labor practices of employer fiduciaries, eagerly 
supported Carter’s proposals. Although the shifting economic and political sands at the time made it unlikely, 
had the Carter plan been a success, a tripartite board with labor representation would have been set up and 
given the state’s backing, guaranteeing minimum rates of return to investments that helped the US economy 
reindustrialize. 
The failure of the Carter plan represents what Barrington Moore termed, “a suppressed historical alternative.” 
Had it been successful, it’s likely that union capacities concerning pension fund control would have been 
enhanced. And with greater control, it’s plausible that a much larger portion of American finance would have 
been put into socially responsible investments. I make this argument through a comparison with the creation of 
the Solidarity Fund in Quebec, Canada. Although the Solidarity Fund is not a traditional fund, it is not collectively 
bargained, and participation is voluntary, its creation afforded the major labor federation in Quebec control over 
financial investments where there was none before. The result was the mobilization of workers’ finance for 
sustainable growth. 
I would like to end with some speculation. Because unions were unable to control pension funds after the war 
and again in the 1980s need not mean that democratic restructuring of finance is impossible in the pension 
system. Indeed, in comparison to the finance circulated by banks and hedge funds where workers have fewer 
claims, it remains the most promising place to wage union campaigns. Since the mid-1990s unions have once 
again turned to pension funds as potential instruments for progressive ends. Most recently, after the December 
2012 Sandy Hook shooting, the United Federation of Teachers pushed their $46.6 billion fund to disinvest from 
companies that make guns and ammunition. But unions have also focused their organizational energies onto 
forms of shareholder activism that aim to influence corporate governance.113 Unions have used funds to 
pressure the boards of firms such as Borders Books, Comcast, Exxon Mobile, General Electric, IBM, Safeway, 
Taco Bell, and Walmart—sometimes successfully but often not. According to a recent report from the 
Manhattan Institute, 36 percent of the shareholder resolutions in 2011 and 2012 were proposed by unions.114 
Although more research and labor activism is needed, it appears that legal reforms that expanded minority 
shareholder protections were a significant factor for this change in union capacity. In 1992, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission altered proxy rules, giving funds more room to coordinate before shareholder meetings. 
And after the 2002 Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which established 
new transparency regulations on publicly traded corporations and their managers. Clearly, though, if unions are 
to gain greater control of retirement funds more far-reaching legal reforms are needed to give them greater 
leverage as shareholders in firms, to expand their capacities as fund fiduciaries, or to create new state-
supported retirement funds that they can manage themselves. Unions have an interest in directly exerting 
greater control of pension investments through financial restructuring. However, to do so the legal barriers in 
the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA need to be removed or revised. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the editors of Politics & Society for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of the article. 
Fred Block, in particular, read and commented on several revisions. Julia Adams, Daniel Béland, Jonah Birch, G. 
William Domhoff, Barry Eidlin, Jeff Goodwin, Gabriel Hetland, Ira Katznelson, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Steven 
Lukes, Aaron Major, Jeff Manza, Glen Pine, Charles Post, Jake Rosenfeld, and Jim Wooten all provided helpful 
comments at various stages. The archivists at the George Meany Memorial Archives and the Hagley Library were 
particularly helpful for navigating the historical record. 
Declaration of Conflicting Interests 
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article. 
Funding 
This project was supported by the National Science Foundation (Award # SES-1002813), the Horowitz 
Foundation for Social Policy, and the Center for the History of Business, Technology and Society. 
Notes 
1.Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Fred 
Block, “Crisis and Renewal: The Outlines for a 21st Century New Deal,” Socio-Economic Review 9, no. 1 
(2010): 31-57; Michael Konczal, “The Current State of Financial Reform,” The Roosevelt Institute. 
Published online March 26 (2010); Paul Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co, 2012); Hans-Werner Sinn, Casino Capitalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
2.Gerald F. Davis, Managed By the Markets (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Richard Deeg, “The Limits of 
Liberalization? American Capitalism at the Crossroads,” Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 8 
(2012): 1249-68; William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, “Maximizing Share-Holder Value: A New 
Ideology for Corporate Governance.” Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 13-35; Monica Prasad, The 
Politics of Free Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 67-70. 
3.Deeg, “The Limits of Liberalism.” 
4.Greta Krippner, “The Financialization of the American Economy,” Socio-Economic Review 3 (2005): 173-208. 
5.Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on the Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Thomas W. Volscho and 
Nathan J. Kelly, “The Rise of the Super Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the 
Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008.” American Sociological Review 77, no. 5 (2012): 679-99. 
6.Arthur MacEwan and John A. Miller, Economic Collapse, Economic Change (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2011); 
Sinn, Casino Capitalism. 
7.Block, “Crisis and Renewal,” 44; Fred Block, “Democratizing Finance,” Politics & Society 42, no. 1 (2014): 3-28. 
8.Krugman, End This Depression, 215. 
9.For two examples from this journal see: Robin Blackburn, “The Global Pension Crisis: From Gray Capitalism to 
Responsible Accumulation,” Politics & Society 34 (2006): 135-86; Ewald Engelen, “Resocializing Capital: 
Putting Pension Savings in the Service of ‘Financial Pluralism’?” Politics & Society 34 (2006): 187-218. See 
also: Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb, and Joel Rogers, Working Capital. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001). 
10.Thomas Kalinowski, “Regulating International Finance and the Diversity of Capitalism,” Socio-Economic 
Review 11 (2013):471-496; Aaron Major, “Neoliberalism and the New International Financial 
Architecture,” Review of International Political Economy 19, no. 4 (2012): 536-561; Renate Mayntz, 
“Financial Market Regulation in the Shadow of the Sovereign Debt Crisis,” MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/11 
(2013). 
11.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Z.1, Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States,” (2010) <http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20100311>. 
12.Gordon L. Clark, Pension Fund Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
13.Michael A. McCarthy, “Political Mediation and American Old-Age Security Exceptionalism,” Work & 
Occupations 41, no. 2 (2014): 175-209. 
14.U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Digest of One-Hundred Selected Pension Plans Under Collective 
Bargaining,” Bulletin No. 1232 (1957-58). 
15.Frank R. Dobbin, “The Origins of Private Social Insurance: Public Policy and Fringe Benefits in America, 1920-
1950,” The American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 5 (1992): 1416-50; Marie Gottschalk, The Shadow 
Welfare State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Sanford Jacoby, Modern Manors (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
16.For work that takes a subtle approach to interplay between unions and political institutions see: 
Gottschalk, Shadow Welfare State; Victoria Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992); Klein, For All These Rights; Nelson Lichtenstein, State of the 
Union (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Tracy Roof, American Labor, Congress, and the 
Welfare State, 1935-2010 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). 
17.Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1978). 
18.Board of Governors, “Federal Reserve Statistical Release.” 
19.Robin Blackburn, Banking on Death (London: Verso Books, 2002), 109. 
20.Michael J. Clowes, The Money Flood (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 13. 
21.U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies, Pension Fund Investment 
Policies (Washington DC: GPO, 1978). 
22.Employee Health and Benefits Committee, NAM “A Fresh Look at Retirement Security,” March 1958. NAM 
Series I, Box 274, 21. Hagley Library and Museum, Wilmington, Delaware. 
23.Board of Governors, “Federal Reserve Statistical Release.” 
24.Among other things, the study also found that the same sample of funds held $2.6 billion in common stock in 
fourteen companies that violated OSHA standards, $3.9 billion of common stock in twenty-six firms that 
were violators of EEO regulations, and $10.1 billion of common stock in thirty companies that are major 
investors or lenders to South Africa. 
25.Corporate Data Exchange, Inc., “Pension Investments: A Social Audit.” August 8, 1979. AFL-CIO Vertical Files, 
Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
26.Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, Pensions (IUD Research Department, 1980). 
27.Ibid., 3. 
28.Ibid., 18. 
29.Arthur Garcia. “Foreign Stocks Attract Larger Share of US Pension Funds.” The Christian Science Monitor (22 
February 1983). AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 2. 
30.Dedra Hauser, “The Unions’ Hidden Asset” The Nation (17 February 1979). AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, 
Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
31.Industrial Union Department, Pensions, 7. 
32.Stuart Dorsey and John Turner, “Union-Nonunion Differences in Pension Fund Investments and 
Earnings,” Industrial Labor and Relations Review 43, no. 5 (1990): 542-55. 
33.Dedra Hauser. “The Unions’ Hidden Asset,” The Nation (17 February 1979). AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, 
Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
34.National Industrial Conference Board, “Financial Management of Pension Trusts,” Studies in Business Policy, 
No. 66, 1954. Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware, 48. 
35.AFL-CIO Pension Fund Investment Study. July 7, 1980. AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, George Meany Memorial 
Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
36.U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employee Benefit Plans Under Collective Bargaining,” Bulletin No. 946 (1948), 
5. 
37.Teresa Ghilarducci, Labor’s Capital (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 38. 
38.“President’s Labor-Management Conference 1945,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce Collection, Series IV, Box 2, 
President’s Labor-Management Conference folder, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware. 
39.Robert H. Zieger, The CIO 1935-1955 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 322. 
40.Frederick H. Harbinson and Robert C. Spencer, “The Politics of Collective Bargaining: The Postwar Record in 
Steel,” The American Political Science Review 48, no. 3 (1954): 712. 
41.“Report of the Sub-Committee on Company-Established Employee Benefit Programs,” National Association of 
Manufacturers Collection, NAM Committee Records, Box 153, NAM Committee Minutes 1948 Jan-March 
folder, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware. 
42.For a discussion of business preferences see Thomas Paster, “Business and Welfare State Development: Why 
Did Employers Accept Social Reforms?” World Politics 65, no. 3 (2013): 416-51. 
43.U.S. Congress, Congressional Record May 13, (1946): 4892. Cited in: Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber, The 
North Will Rise Again: Pensions, Politics and Power in the 1980s (New York: Beacon Press, 1978, 100.). 
44.U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 
Report no. 245. 80th Congress, 1st Session, (1947): 29-30. 
45.Harry A. Mills and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1950), 566. 
46.Gerard D. Reilly, “The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act,” The George Washington Labor Review 285 
(1960): 297. 
47.Stephen Fogdall, “Exclusive Union Control of Pension Funds: Taft-Hartley’s Ill-Considered 
Prohibition,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law 4, no. 1 (2001): 219. 
48.Ibid., 222. 
49.Anderson Steir & Malone LLC, Teamsters: Perception and Reality (Steir, Anderson & Malone, LLC, 2002). 
50.National Association of Manufacturers, circa 1950 “Memorandum Dealing with Some Problems Regarding 
Company-Established Employee Benefit Programs,” NAM Series 1, Box 75. Hagley Museum and Library, 
Wilmington, Delaware. 
51.Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa and the Teamsters (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1965), 
219. 
52.Steir et al., 2002. 
53.William A. O’Barr and John M. Conley, Fortune and Folly: The Wealth and Power of Institutional 
Investing (Homewood: Irwin Professional Publications, 1992). 
54.For the most comprehensive overview of ERISA’s legislative history see: James A. Wooten, The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
55.The Investment Work Group of the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans. 
“Position Paper” January 24, 1978. AFL-CIO, Unprocessed Files, Social Security Office. George Meany 
Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
56.Dorsey and Turner, “Union-Nonunion Differences,” 546, fn6. 
57.Ian D. Lanoff, “The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Lawfully Under 
ERISA?” Labor Law Journal 31, no. 7 (1980). AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany 
Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
58.ERISA charged the Department of Labor with enforcing the law and developing its regulations. It was not until 
August 1977 that pension funds were given specific guidelines as to how the Labor Department would 
interpret ERISA’s prudence standards. See Clowes, Money Flood, 134. 
59.International Foundation News, “Pension Fund Officials Not Optimistic About Economic Outlook Inclined to 
Invest Only in “Blue Chips” Due To ERISA.” AFL-CIO Unprocessed Files, Social Security Office. George 
Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
60.James Cook. “The Most Abused, Misused Pension Fund in America.” Forbes (10 November 1980). 69-82. AFL-
CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
61.Ibid. 
62.Although most unions with single-employer pension plans, such as the United Auto Workers and the United 
Steel Workers, actively supported ERISA, unions with multi-employer plans largely came out in 
opposition to the legislation. See: Wooten, Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 
63.AFL-CIO Pension Fund Investment Study. July 7, 1980. AFL-CIO Unprocessed Files. George Meany Memorial 
Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
64.Moore, Injustice, 376. 
65.Rifkin and Barber, The North Will Rise Again. 
66.Jacob Sheinkman, secretary-treasurer, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, “The Union Role in 
the Boardroom.” Employee Relations Law Journal 5, no. 1 (1979). AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. 
George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
67.AFL-CIO Pension Fund Investment Study. July 7, 1980. AFL-CIO Unprocessed Files. George Meany Memorial 
Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
68.AFL-CIO Pension Fund Investment Study. July 7, 1980. AFL-CIO Unprocessed Files. George Meany Memorial 
Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
69.Jonathan Fuerbinger, “Pension Funds are Freed to Pursue Social Goals” Washington Star (9 June 19 1979). 
AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
70.Lance Gay, “AFL-CIO Plans to Tighten Pension Fund Investments” Washington Star (22 August 1980). AFL-CIO 
Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
71.Harry B. Schecter, director, Office of Housing and Monetary Policy, AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO. “Statement Before the 
Savings, Pensions and Investment Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee on Private 
Pension Fund Investment in Residential Mortgages” May 19, 1982. AFL-CIO Legislation Department 
Testimony, Box 12, Folder 123. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
72.President’s Labor-Management Conference 1945,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce Collection, Series IV, Box 2, 
President’s Labor-Management Conference folder, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware. 
73.McCarthy, “Political Mediation.” 
74.Wooten, Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 
75.A. H. Raskin, “The Week in Review,” New York Times (11 January 1976). 




79.Neal R. Peirce and Carol Steinbach, “Reindustrialization–A Foreign Word to Hard-Pressed American 
Workers,” National Journal 10, no. 25 (1980). 
80.Randy Barber, “Pension Funds in the United States: Issues of Investment and Control,” Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 3 (1982):31-73. 
81.Peter Gall. “Unions Increase Investments in Mortgages,” McGraw-Hill World News (November 1980). AFL-CIO 
Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
82.Mobilizing pension funds for public interests had been tried at the local level during the fiscal crisis in New 
York in 1975. When borrowers stopped lending to the city, the state created the Municipal Assistance 
Corporation. And on the eve of default, the city turned to its pension funds for public employees such as 
firefighters, police, teachers, and transit workers. The funds were then used to invest in bonds issued by 
the Municipal Assistance Corporation. By investing over $1.6 billion in (20 percent of their assets) in the 
city the funds diverted the fiscal crisis. See Roger Lowenstein, While America Aged (New York: The 
Penguin Press, 2005), 114-16. 
83.Gall, “Unions Increase Investments.” 
84.Hillel Gray, New Directions in the Investment and Control of Pension Funds (Washington: Investor 
Responsibility Research Center, 1983). 
85.Lane Kirkland. “AFL-CIO News Release,” October 17, 1980. AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George 
Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
86.Larry Smedley. “AFL-CIO News Service,” September 3, 1980. AFL-CIO Vertical Files, Box 43, Folder 1. George 
Meany Memorial Archives, Silver Spring, Maryland. 
87.Patrick Akard, “The Political Origins of “Supply-Side” Economic Policy: The Humphrey-Hawkins Bill and the 
Revenue Act of 1978” Political Power and Social Theory 10 (1996): 108. 
88.Bernard E. Anderson, “Robert Browne and Full Employment,” Review of Black Political Economy 35 (2008): 
98. 
89.Helen Lachs Ginsburg, “Historical Amnesia: The Humphrey-Hawkins Act, Full Employment and Employment as 
a Right,” Review of Black Political Economy 39 (2012): 130. 
90.Akard, “The Political Origins,” 110. 
91.This idea, in retrospect, was fallacious. Although capital investment in the period was lagging, it was not due 
to a lack of potential investment funds. In fact, the 1974 recession led to a drop of demand and surplus 
of potential investment funds that firms hoarded. Instead, investment lagged because the rate of profit 
had been contracting since the late 1960s. See: Akard, “The Political Origins,” 117-120 for a full 
discussion. 
92.Ginsburg, “Historical Amnesia,” 132. 
93.Natascha van der Zwan, “Contentious Capital: The Politics of Pension Investment in the United States and 
Germany, 1974–2003.” PhD diss., The New School for Social Research (2011): 87-94. 
94.Jack Quarter, Isla Carmichael, Jorge Sousa, and Susan Elgie, “Social Investment by Union-Based Pension Funds 
and Labor-Sponsored Investment Funds in Canada,” Relations Industrielle/Industrial Relations 56, no. 1 
(2001): 94. 
95.The better-known case of unions making real attempts to gain control of pension investments is the Meidner 
Plan in Sweden. In this article, I focus primarily on Quebec. There, unions were much more successful 
than were unions in Sweden when they created the wage earner funds in 1983. The wage earner funds 
are the better-known case, however, because in their earliest iteration they greatly exceeded the 
Solidarity Fund’s scope as a means to transfer control of capital to unions. While not a case in this study, 
the Meidner Plan can be seen as consistent with the political approach to financial control that I have 
developed here. For more information on the Meidner Plan see: Jonas Pontusson, The Limits of Social 
Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 186-219. 
96.Tessa Hebb, Interview with author, August 6, 2013. 
97.Ibid. 
98.Yvan Comeau and Benoît Lévesque, “Workers’ Financial Participation in the Property of Enterprises in 
Québec,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 14 (1993): 237. 
99.Fonds de Solidarité FTQ, Building Tomorrow, Every Day: 2012 Annual and Sustainability Report. Solidarity 
Fund (2012). 
100.Unions have not been unified in support of these funds. In particular, the Canadian Auto Workers were 
vocal opponents, arguing that they amounted to tax breaks for firms, that savings held in individual 
retirement accounts was inconsistent with the more pro-labor view that workers’ retirement should be 
pooled collectively, and that they turn workers into capitalists. Gindin, Sam, former research director of 
the Canadian Auto Workers. Author interview, May 22, 2013. 
101.Tessa Hebb and David Mackenzie, “Canadian Labour-Sponsored Investment Funds: A Model for U.S. 
Economically Targeted Investments,” in A. Fung, T. Hebb and J. Rogers, eds., Working Capital (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 131. 
102.Quarter et al., “Social Investment,” 95. 
103.Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux, Centrale de l’Enseignement du Québec, The History of the Labor 
Movement in Québec (Québec: Black Rose Books, 1987), 247. 
104.Carla Lipsig-Mummé, “Future Conditional: Wars of Position in the Quebec Labour Movement,” Studies in 
Political Economy 36 (1991): 93. 
105.Rene Lévesque, “For an Independent Québec,” Foreign Affairs 54 (1976): 743. 
106.Québec Government, Challenges for Québec: A Statement on Economic Policy Synopsis, Policy Objectives 
and Measures (Quebec: Editeur Officiel du Québec, 1979). 
107.Hebb and Mackenzie, “Canadian Labour-Sponsored Investment.” 
108.Ibid., 130. 
109.Solidarity Fund, http://www.fondsftq.com/en/a-propos/notre-histoire.aspx 
110.Peter Drucker, The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America (New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1976), 1-4. 
111.Democratic Senator Lee Metcalf went as far as to call this a “monstrous myth.” U.S. Congressional Record, 
October 26, 1977, E 6579. 
112.Block, “Democratizing Finance”; Krugman, End This Depression. 
113.Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
114.James R. Copland, “Proxy Monitor 2012: A Report on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism,” 
Report from Manhattan Institute (2012). 
